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Abstract—Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) are playing
a major role in building security and trust in Internet of
Things (IoT) systems. However, IoT deployments with a large
number of devices, such as in environment monitoring applica-
tions, generate and send massive amounts of data. This would
generate vast number of transactions that must be processed
within the distributed ledger. In this work, we first demonstrate
that the Proof of Work (PoW) blockchain fails to scale in a
sizable IoT connectivity infrastructure. To solve this problem,
we present a lightweight distributed ledger scheme to integrate
PoW blockchain into IoT. In our scheme, we classify transactions
into two types: 1) global transactions, which must be processed
by global blockchain nodes and 2) local transactions, which can
be processed locally by entities called witnesses. Performance
evaluation demonstrates that our proposed scheme improves
the scalability of integrated blockchain and IoT monitoring
systems by processing a fraction of the transactions, inversely
proportional to the number of witnesses, locally. Hence, reducing
the number of global transactions.
Index Terms—Distributed Ledgers, Blockchain, IoT, Witness,
Environment Monitoring, scalability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) provide high lev-
els of security, accountability, tractability, and privacy to
the transmitted data [1]. This is achieved by enabling key
functionalities, such as transparency, distributed operation,
and immutability [2]. The benefits of DLTs are particularly
appealing for Internet of Things (IoT) applications, where
large amounts of data are generated and the devices can only
implement weak security mechanisms [3].
The trust provided by DLTs is greatly valuable in IoT
monitoring applications with a large number of devices. As
an example, consider an urban IoT application that monitors
the air quality and gas emissions. The data generated by
this application is critical, so it must be protected, tractable,
immutable, and transparent. Nevertheless, in a traditional mon-
itoring system, the inter-organization sharing the data may be
untrusted, complex, unreliable, and non-transparent. Besides,
the current IoT-based monitoring systems are centralized,
which leads to a single point of failure, where data can be
lost or modified [4].
The problems described above may be solved by integrat-
ing Blockchain into IoT applications. However, Blockchain
architectures were not designed to handle a large number of
transactions, which would be generated by naively integrating
Blockchain into IoT. Specifically, IoT deployments usually
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Fig. 1: Overview of our Blockchain-enabled IoT system
wiBlock. The IoT nodes generate and send the transactions
to the base stations, which in turn send them to the witnesses.
These decide which transactions must be sent to the GB and
process the rest.
present a star topology, in which the devices communicate
directly to the base stations (BS), which then redirects the
gathered data to the destination [5] (e.g., from Narrowband IoT
(NB-IoT) or LoRa deployments to a cloud server), as shown in
the left part of Fig. 1. In the most Blockchain and IoT integra-
tion, this same architecture would be used, and the BS would
be in charge of communicating with the Blockchain [6]. Thus,
every packet generated by the IoT devices would represent a
transaction, which can easily overload the Blockchain.
Three main challenges must be overcome to achieve an
efficient integration of Blockchain into IoT. First, DLTs use di-
verse resource-intensive gating functions, for example, Proof-
of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS), while IoT devices are
resource-constrained. As a consequence, the processing time
of these functions in IoT devices would be restrictive. Second,
the widely-used Blockchain arrangement cannot handle the
massive transactions generated by IoT devices. For example,
Bitcoin network produces 1 MB blocks, roughly once every
10 minutes, with an average size of transaction around 500
bytes, which give 7 transactions per second (tps). In com-
parison, Visa system performs 2000 tps on average, and an
average daily peak of 4000 tps, with a maximum capacity of
56000 tps. Third, the power saving mechanisms of the IoT
devices can cause problems during knowledge dissemination
and synchronization. For instance, an update may be severely
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delayed or even fail to arrive if a device is in sleep mode.
In this paper, we present a witness-based Blockchain system
called wiBlock, especially designed to integrate Blockchain
into resource-constrained IoT applications. It is aimed to solve
three of the main problems of traditional IoT monitoring
systems, namely trust, scalability, and cost. This is achieved
by: 1) enabling the use of DLTs to store IoT data, 2) limiting
the number of transactions that must be processed at the Global
Blockchain (GB), and 3) eliminating the need for complex
computations and supporting sleep-awake mechanisms at the
IoT devices, respectively.
The architecture of wiBlock is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the
IoT devices interact exclusively with the witness system, which
then may process the transactions locally or communicate
directly with the GB. The transactions that must be pro-
cessed by the GB are called global transactions, whereas the
transactions that can be verified locally at the witness system
are called local transactions. In order to see the need for
this differentiation, consider a pollution monitoring system, in
which a number of sensors in a given local area are associated
to the same witness. Then a local transaction can be used to
send local sensing data from a device associated with the same
witness. For instance, the alarm sensor periodically requests
gas sensor which collects the concentration of pollutants e.g.,
SO2, CO2, NO to detect the abnormal condition in air. In order
to see the need for a global transaction, note that sensors may
wish to store their sensing data to external storage system e.g,
IPFS [7] or control a thermostat sensor, which is located in a
different area and associated with a different witness to adapt
temperature. In this case there is a need to communicate via
different heterogeneous networks and record the transaction
results to the GB via global transactions. Thus, the witness
system reduces the number of transactions that need to be
processed by the GB and the latency of transaction verification.
Furthermore, wiBlock allows each IoT device to communicate
with several witnesses. This avoids having a single point of
failure (i.e., bridge) between the IoT device and the GB, which
in turn greatly increases the reliability of the IoT application.
For example, Blockchain witness models have been found to
be beneficial for Cloud Service Level Agreement [8].
The contributions of this work are as follows:
1) We investigate the possibilities of naively integrating
Blockchain directly into resource-constrained IoT sys-
tems. We identify some of the major problems that arise
in this setup, which illustrate that Blockchain technology
is not directly applicable to massive IoT.
2) We propose a new IoT-friendly distributed ledger system
named wiBlock. It aims to solve the scalability issues of
Blockchain in massive IoT environment by defining two
types of transactions: global and local.
3) We thoroughly compare the performance wiBlock with
that of a naive Blockchain and IoT integrated archi-
tecture. Our results show that our proposed system
enhances the scalability of the GB network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the system model, followed by the design
of our novel wiBlock system in Section III. We present the
analysis and performance evaluation of wiBlock in Section IV
and Section V, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an IoT application with k devices. These are
deployed uniformly at random in a squared area of interest
A ∈ R2. The IoT devices generate transactions with the data
collected from the environment according to a Poisson process
with rate λ.
In the most simple Blockchain and IoT integrated architec-
ture, the transactions are sent to the BS, which then redirects
them to the GB. In wiBlock, the transactions are sent to the
witness system instead. This is a set of v witnesses, which have
the capacity to verify transactions locally and to communicate
with the GB. The time needed for a witness to perform these
operations determine its capacity and depend on numerous
factors. However, it is out of the scope of this paper to derive
their precise values. Transactions are grouped into blocks
of size b. Therefore, a new block is created when b new
transactions are received at a server.
Witnesses may be either physical or logical entities, hence,
their organization is flexible. For simplicity, throughout this
paper we assume one witness is deployed at each BS and use
these terms interchangeably. The BSs are distributed randomly
within A. We denote the set of IoT devices and witnesses as
D = {1, 2, . . . , k} and W = {1, 2, . . . , v}, respectively.
The IoT devices and witnesses communicate through wire-
less links under a standard path loss model and large-scale
(slow) fading. Thus, a transaction is transmitted successfully
from IoT device i to a witness w ∈ W with probability
ps(i, w). The IoT device i selects the witness w according
to a predefined strategy. If the transmission fails, i attempts
the transmission to a different witness. This process is repeated
until the transaction is confirmed or until a given number of
attempts is reached without success.
We consider a simple shadowing propagation model for the
communication between IoT devices and witnesses where, for
a given transmission power Pt and carrier frequency f , the
received power at a distance d is
Pr(d) = 10 log10
(
PtGtGr c
2
(4pif)2dβ
)
+N(0, σdB) dB (1)
where Gt and Gr are the transmitter and receiver antenna
gains, respectively, c = 3 · 108 m/s is the speed of light,
N(0, σdB) is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable (RV) with
standard deviation σdB dB, and β is the path loss exponent.
From there, the outage probability at a given distance and
receiver sensitivity γ is
pout(d) = 1−Q
(
1
σdB
10 log10
(
γ(4pif)2dβ
PtGtGrc2
))
(2)
and ps(i, w) = 1 − pout(d(i, w)). Throughout this paper, we
assume that the wireless resources are sufficient to support
the communication between the IoT devices and the witness
system and do not go into the details of the access protocols.
Therefore, collisions caused by simultaneous transmissions
from the IoT devices to a witness w can be avoided or resolved
if the links toward w are not in outage. Finally, no errors occur
in the communication between the witness system and the GB.
III. WiBlock DESIGN
This section presents the detailed description of wiBlock
architectural elements and operation.
A. Witness-based Blockchain System
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the witness-based Blockchain Sys-
tem consists of three main components: the GB, the witness
system, and the physical IoT devices. The first action per-
formed by the IoT devices after deployment is authentication.
For this, each device i ∈ D performs a key exchange
procedure with a witness w ∈ W to gain the necessary
permissions and build secure channels to perform transactions.
After authentication, the tuple (i, w) is added by w to the
shared registry of the witness system R. For this, w shares
the authentication information of i (i.e., credentials) with the
rest of the witnesses. By keeping a shared registry, device i
can communicate with any witness, even though is registered
with w. After authentication, IoT devices collect the data
and sign it by using a SecretKey skey(i) that is unique
for each i as Sign(data, skey(i), timestamp τ ). Next, the
transaction is created and transmitted to a witness w. Note
that this latter witness may be different to the one which
i is registered with. Local transactions, denoted as Ll, are
exchanged exclusively between w and all the IoT devices
registered with it {i ∈ D : (i, w) ∈ R}, for which the
managers implement a consensus procedure. On the other
hand, Global transactions, denoted as LG, must be sent from
a witness w to the GB when (i, w) /∈ R. These two types of
transactions are further described in the following.
1) Local Transactions: These transactions are transmitted
from IoT device i to the witness w, whose key management
component confirms that (i, w) ∈ R. Then, this same com-
ponent checks whether the PublicKey pkey(i) of i has been
associated with any block in the local ledger. If pkey(i) has
not been associated with any block, the witness w generates a
new block for the given i. Then, w arranges the transactions
in order, updates the local ledger, and a notification feedback
message is transmitted to the devices.
2) Global Transactions: These transactions are transmitted
from IoT device i to the witness w, whose key manage-
ment component confirms that (i, w) /∈ R. Then, this same
component will clarify which witness i is registered with.
If ∃w′ ∈ W s.t. (i, w′) ∈ R, the transaction is forwarded
to the GB. In case the GB has a block associated with
given device i, the transaction will be validated based on the
corresponding signature Sign(data, skey(i), timestamp τ ) and,
if the signature is valid, the transaction is appended to the
block and transmitted back to the witness w′. Note that this
type of transactions will be frequently generated when the IoT
devices are mobile. For example, cargo, supply chain, and car
subsystem monitoring.
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Fig. 2: Transaction flow in wiBlock, from generation to con-
firmation.
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Fig. 3: In wiBlock, each IoT device has a list of eligible
witnesses. Transactions generated by the IoT devices are sent
to a witness in this list, according to the witness selection
strategy.
B. Witness Selection
Numerous witness selection strategies can be implemented
at the IoT devices and each one may offer different benefits.
However, the focus of the present work is to evaluate the bene-
fits of the witness-based architecture, rather than to identify an
optimal witness selection strategy. Therefore, we consider the
following a heuristic witness selection strategies and evaluate
the performance of the witness system. As illustrated in Fig. 3,
IoT devices select one of the v available witnesses with
probability 1/v and transmit the transaction. Then, if the link
between IoT device i and witness w is not in outage, the
transaction is confirmed. Otherwise, i selects a new witness
uniformly at random fromW\w and transmits the transaction.
This process is repeated until the transaction is confirmed or
until a given number of attempts l ≤ v is reached without
success. This is the simplest strategy and assumes the IoT
devices have no information about the state of the wireless
channel toward each witness separately.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Queuing model of the witness system
We consider a queuing model for witness-based Blockchain
network as described in Fig. 4. The witnesses and Blockchain
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Fig. 4: Witness-based Blockchain queuing model described in
Section IV.
are modelled as queuing nodes to capture the number of
transactions that must be i) processed locally by witnesses
and ii) forwarded to the GB to be processed. We assume
that transactions are generated by the IoT devices following
a Poisson process. Hence, we denote λ(i) as the transaction
generation rate at IoT device i.
Let p(i, w) be the probability that i chooses witness w and
ps(i, w) be the probability that the link between i and w is
not in outage. Building on this, the average transaction arrival
rate at the witness w is
λw =
k∑
i=1
p(i, w)ps(i, w)λ(i). (3)
Hence, the transaction arrival rate of different witnesses de-
pends on the density and location of the deployed IoT devices
and witnesses, but also on the witness selection criteria.
The probability p(i, w) depends on the witness selection
strategy. For the strategy 1, random selection, let A(w, u)
be the matrix of permutations of u elements taken from
{1−ps(i, w′)}w′∈W\w with (v−1)Pu rows and u columns. The
element in row x and column y ≤ u of A(w, u) is denoted
axy(w, u). From there, we can calculate p(i, w) as:
p(i, w) =
1
v
+
1
v!
l−1∑
u=1
(v − u− 1)!
(v−1)Pu∑
x=1
u∏
y=1
axy(w, u) (4)
As mentioned above, generated transactions are either
global LG or local Ll. We define p as the probability that
a transaction sent to a witness is Global. Hence, 1− p is the
probability that a transaction is local. Please observe that the
value of p only depends on the number of witnesses v and is
p := Pr [(i, w) /∈ R] = (v − 1)/v.
The transaction processing time is assumed to follow an
exponential distribution with service rates µ1 and µ2 for global
and local transactions, respectively, and transactions are served
according to a first-come first-served (FCFS) policy. Building
on this, we model the operation of each witness as an M/H2/1
queue, which means that transactions arrive at the witness w
at a rate λw and the service time is represented by a two-
phase hyper-exponential distribution. With probability p, the
first transaction in the queue receives service at rate µ1, while
with probability 1− p, it receives service rate at rate µ2. That
is, the type of transaction is defined at the beginning of service.
The state of each witness is represented by a pair (m,n), in
which m is the total number of transactions in the witness and
n ∈ {1, 2} is the current service phase, which depends on the
type of transaction being served. The stationary distribution of
this queue in the witness w can be obtained by Neuts’ Matrix
Geometric Method [9]. We denote the stationary probability
vector as:
τ (w) =
[
τ
(w)
0 , τ
(w)
1 , τ
(w)
2 , . . . , τ
(w)
k , . . .
]
, (5)
where τ (w)m is the steady-state probability of m transactions in
the witness w. Alternatively, the mean service rate is
µ =
(
p
µ1
+
1− p
µ2
)−1
, (6)
and the offered load to w is ρw = λw/µ. From there, the we
calculate the variance of the service time
σ2w = 2
(
p
µ21
+
1− p
µ22
)
− 1
µ2
(7)
and the coefficient of variation C2w = µ
2σ2w. Then, the average
number of transactions in the queue of w is
L(w) =
∞∑
m=0
mτ (j)m = ρw +
(
1 + C2w
2
)
ρ2w
1− ρw . (8)
Then, the number of local transactions and Global transac-
tions handled by w are, respectively,
Lg(w) = pL(w) (9)
and
Ll(w) = (1− p)L(w) = L(w)− Lg(w). (10)
B. Global Blockchain (GB) System
We model the GB as a modified M/GB/1 queue as
in [10]. Let Lg and Tg be the RVs that define the number
of transactions in the Blockchain queue and the confirmation
time. We are interested in finding their mean values. For this,
we define b to be the maximum number of transactions in a
block (i.e., the maximum block size). Hence, transactions are
grouped into blocks and a new block is created when there
are b transactions in the Blockchain server.
Given that p is the probability that a transaction sent to a
witness is processed at the GB, the transaction arrival rate at
the GB from the v witnesses in the IoT deployment is
λB =
v∑
w=1
λwp. (11)
We denote U as of the block generation time (i.e., the time
it takes to generate a block) at the GB. Then,
We define U to be the continuous RV of the processing (i.e.,
service) time of a block at the GB. Hence, the system is stable
and a limiting probability exists if and only if λBE[U ] < b.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the proba-
bility density function (pdf) of U are denoted G(x) and g(x),
respectively. We use these to calculate the hazard rate of U as
θ(x) =
g(x)
1−G(x) . (12)
Next, we define Lsg(t) as the number of transactions in
server at time t, Lqg(t) as the number of transaction in the
queue at time t, and X(t) as the elapsed service time of the
current transaction at t. From [11], we define
Pm,n(x, t)dx = Pr
[
Lsg(t) = m,L
q
g(t) = n,
x < X(t) ≤ x+ dx] (13)
to be the joint probability that, at time t ≥ 0, there are
m ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., b} and n ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., x} transactions in
server and queue, respectively, and the elapsed service time
lies between x and x + dx. Next, we denote Pm,n(x) =
limt−→∞ Pm,n(x, t) and consider the two following cases. In
the first one we have ddxPm,n(x) = − [λB + θ(x)]Pm,n(x)+
λBPm,n−1(x), for 0 ≤ m ≤ b and n ≥ 1, which shows
that the number of transactions in the server and the queue
does not change during a small interval. In the second one we
have ddxPm,0(x) = − [λB + θ(x)]Pm,0(x), for 0 ≤ m ≤ b,
which occurs when a transaction arrives at the system with 0
transactions in the queue. For the purposes of our study, it is
sufficient to calculate the mean confirmation time as
E[Tg]=
[
λ2BE[U
2]− b(b− 1)− 2 (b− λBE[U2])
+
b−1∑
n=0
αn
(
λBE[U
2](b− n) + 2bE[U ](b− n) (14)
+E[U ]
(
b2 − b− n2 + n))] 1
2λB(b− λBE[U ]) ,
where αn =
∑b
m=0
∞∫
0
Pm,n(x)θ(x)dx. The interested reader
is referred to [10] for the fully detailed Blockchain queuing
model.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we use the queuing models described in
Section IV to evaluate the performance of wiBlock in terms
of scalability. For this, we obtain the maximum transaction
generation rate, along with the mean confirmation time and
ledger size for both, the local and global Blockchain. We use
the performance of a naive Blockchain and IoT integrated
architecture, where the IoT devices communicate directly to
the GB, as a benchmark. The mean results regarding the
connectivity of the IoT devices with the witness system are
TABLE I: Parameter settings for the performance evaluation.
Parameter Symbol Value
Area of deployment A 100× 100 m2
Number of IoT devices k 500
Number of witnesses v {2, 3, ..., 10}
Carrier frequency f 914 MHz
Transmission power Pt 0.28183815 W
Antenna gains Gt, Gr 1
Receiver sensitivity γ 3.652 · 10−10 W
Standard deviation of shadow fading σdB 6 dB
Path loss exponent β 3
Block size b 1000 transactions
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Fig. 5: Maximum transaction generation rate per IoT device
λ∗ for traditional Blockchain IoT and wiBlock with random
witness selection.
obtained by a large number of Monte Carlo simulations and
then used as an input to the queuing models.
In our analysis, each device generates transactions at a rate
λ(i) = λ for all i ∈ D. The block generation time U is expo-
nentially distributed with parameter µB = 1.8·10−3 blocks per
second. So we have g(x) = µB exp(−µBx), E [U ] = 1/µB ,
and E
[
U2
]
= 1/µ2B . Furthermore, we define the default
block size to be b = 1000 transactions. The rest of relevant
parameters are listed in Table I; these values are used unless
otherwise stated.
For the selected parameter settings, the GB system is stable
when λ∗B = b/E [U ] = 1.8. Building on this, from (11) we
have that λ < b/(kE [U ]) = 1.8/k must hold for the GB
to be stable in a traditional Blockchain architecture with k
identical IoT devices. Conversely, for wiBlock with random
witness selection, we have that only a fraction p = (v − 1)/v
of the transactions must be sent to the GB. Hence, assuming no
wireless channel errors occur and all the generated transactions
are sent to a witness (i.e.,
∑v
w=1 λw = kλ), the maximum load
per IoT device that wiBlock can handle is
λ <
bv
kE [U ] (v − 1) =
1.8v
k(v − 1) = λ
∗(v), (15)
as shown in Fig. 5 for v = {2, 4, 8}.
Hence, from the GB perspective, wiBlock allows to deploy
1/p = v/(v − 1) times more IoT devices than the naively
integrated approach, as illustrated by Fig. 6. Note that the
greatest gains in the scalability are obtained when v is small,
however, other factors such as the area coverage and process-
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Fig. 6: Ratio of transactions processed at the GB and at the
witness system as a function of the number of witnesses v.
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Fig. 7: (a) Mean transaction confirmation time E [Tg] as a
function of the transaction generation rate at the IoT devices
λ and (b) ledger size at the GB and at each witness for v = 2
as a function of the block size b for traditional Blockchain IoT
and wiBlock.
ing capacity of the witness system must be taken onto account
to select adequate values of v.
Next, we evaluate the mean transaction confirmation time at
the GB E [Tg]. Note that, in case a single witness is deployed
in the system, all the transactions generated by the IoT devices
will be considered as local transactions and processed locally.
This can overload the witness, depending on its capabilities. In
particular, the witness is stable if and only if the load offered
to the witness is λ1 < µ2. Furthermore, deploying a single
witness does not provide the necessary wireless coverage.
That is, the more witnesses are deployed, the higher the
probability of being able to communicate to, at least, one
of them. Hence, we consider the cases where at least two
witnesses are deployed, as shown in Fig. 7a for v = {2, 3, 4}.
As Fig. 7a shows, the witness system reduces the number
of transactions sent to the GB and, as a consequence, greatly
reduces the transaction confirmation time. Besides, the ledger
size is considerably reduced, depending on the number of
witnesses. This can be seen in Fig. 7b for v = 2, where
the ledger size of the GB is half of that with the traditional
Blockchain and IoT integration, and the local ledger size at
each witness is 1/v2 = 1/4 of it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented and evaluated the performance of
a novel witness-based Blockchain system for IoT applications.
As a starting point, we described the benefits of integrating
Blockchain into IoT and the main challenges that must be
overcome to achieve this integration. Building on these, we
designed wiBlock, an IoT-friendly distributed system that in-
corporates a witness system to address scalability issues of
Blockchain. The scalability gains provided by wiBlock are
achieved by processing some of the transactions generated
by the IoT devices locally, at the witness system. Our results
show that the witness system greatly reduces the number of
transactions transmitted to the Blockchain network and the
transaction confirmation time. Future work includes the design
of witness selection algorithms and implement wiBlock in real
testbed to further exploit the benefits provided by the witness
system.
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